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Abstract
A Privacy-Preserving Method with Flexible Charging Schedules for
Electric Vehicles in the Smart Grid
Sabrina Afrin
The Smart Grid (SG) is an emerging modernized electrical power sys-
tem with advanced monitoring and control mechanism, and improved fault-
tolerance. The SG converges traditional power grid with a bidirectional
communication and information system into the same infrastructure. Elec-
tric Vehicles (EVs), with their energy storage capacity and bidirectional
communication capability, are envisioned to be an essential component of
the SG. EVs can play the role of distributed energy resources by storing en-
ergy in off-peak hours and providing energy to the grid during peak hours
or system contingencies. The energy stored by an EV is equivalent to the
average energy drawn by multiple residential houses. As a result, simultane-
ous charging by a large number of EVs can create sudden energy imbalance
in the grid. The mismatch between the energy generation and demand can
create cascading faults resulting in load shedding. To prevent such situa-
tion, EVs are required to pre-schedule charging events at a Charging Station
(CS). To efficiently manage a scheduled event, an EV is required to transmit
information such as a valid ID, state-of-charge, distance from a CS, loca-
tion, speed, etc. However, the data transmitted by an EV can be used to
reveal information such as the movement of the vehicle, visits to a hospi-
tal, time to arrive at office, etc. The transmitted information can be used to
create profiles of the owners of the EVs, breaching their location privacy.
In the existing literature, it is recommended to use pseudonyms for dif-
ferent transactions by an EV to achieve location privacy. The majority of
the works in the literature are based on anonymous authentication mecha-
nism, where missing a charging event by an EV is considered as malicious
and the corresponding EV is penalized (e.g., blacklisted). However, miss-
ing a charging event may happen due to many valid reasons and flexibility
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of scheduling can encourage consumer participation. On the other hand,
missing charging events results in monetary loss to the CSs. In this the-
sis, an authentication method is developed to provide anonymity to EVs.
The proposed method also addresses the cost-effectiveness of flexibility in
charging events for the EVs and the CSs. A network setup that sub-divides
a regional area into smaller zones to achieve better privacy, is proposed. A
MATLAB simulation is designed to demonstrate the Degree of Anonymity
(DoA) achieved in different stages of the proposed method and the optimal
number of missed charging events. Additionally, a method to determine
sub-division of zones from the simulation results, is studied.
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The Smart Grid (SG), also known as the “intelligent grid” [2] or the “In-
ternet of energy” [5], is a modernized version of the electric power grid. The
traditional power grid was designed in the 20th century, based on a hierar-
chical and centralized SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition)
control system architecture, where electricity flows from central generators
to the customer domain [1]. In this radial power system, after being gen-
erated, electricity flows through the transmission lines and reaches the end
users via the distribution system (e.g., transformer), as shown in Fig. 1.1
The occurrence of large-scale power outages (e.g., the 2003 Northeast
blackout, the California energy crisis, etc.) during the last few decades has
necessitated the convergence towards an efficient, fault-tolerant and intelli-
gent power system. One of the main reasons of power outage is the mis-
match between electricity generation and demand. The diminishing carbon-
based energy resources (e.g., coal, gas, etc.) are not sufficient to meet the
electricity demand of today’s large population [1]. Moreover, the tradi-
tional energy sources have a negative impact on the environment by emitting
green-house gas. As a result, the integration of renewable energy sources
(e.g., solar, wind, hydro, etc.) into the grid has become necessary. However,
the power generated from different energy sources have different frequen-
cies and qualities. A distributed control system is required to coordinate the
heterogeneous grid components to meet the nominal grid conditions. On
the other hand, the hierarchical topology of existing power system causes
2
Figure 1.1: Elements of a traditional power grid [2]
a domino-effect failures of faults in the distribution system [6]. A bidirec-
tional communication infrastructure can make the grid situation-aware by
collecting real-time information from the entities connected to it. In this
way, an abnormal condition or a fault can be isolated before it cascades
through the interconnected system. By converging the traditional power
system with a communication and information system, the SG emerges as a
distributed power system with pervasive monitoring and control mechanism
[6].
The SG is an information-centric, bidirectional, and heterogeneous elec-
trical power infrastructure. The SG incorporates entities from different
sources which can play multiple roles in the grid mechanism. For exam-
ple, the energy consumers in the SG can generate (e.g., with solar panels)
and store energy, and later, sell it back to the grid. Therefore, they can si-
multaneously play the role of electricity consumer and supplier. Fig. 1.2
shows the conceptual model of the SG proposed by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) [7]. The dotted orange and the solid blue
lines represent the electricity flow and the information flow, respectively.
The two-way flow of electricity and information in the SG is envisioned to
support advanced metering infrastructure, real-time monitoring and smart
management system. The smart energy management system in the SG will
enable the consumer domain and the grid to interact with each other and
3
Figure 1.2: The seven-domain conceptual model of the smart grid [2]
exchange electricity, price and demand information [8].
The SG offers different distinguishing features such as dynamic pricing,
demand response, peak-shaving, etc. Dynamic pricing provides variable
electricity prices based on the current load-demand condition in the grid,
i.e., high price when demand is high and low price during off-peak hours.
In the traditional grid, 20% of its generation capacity is reserved to meet
peak time demand [6]. During emergency, reserved generators are used in a
minute-by-minute basis to balance load-demand, which is very costly. In the
SG, this situation can be improved by demand response and peak-shaving,
in which consumers change their energy usage pattern to balance the grid.
As the SG offers dynamic pricing of energy, customers can subscribe to the
demand response feature. During the peak-hour (e.g., at noon or evening),
the subscribers refrain from performing the tasks requiring high energy and
schedule them to the off-peak hours (e.g., at night). If a large number of
consumers participate, the total demand will be reduced in the peak time.
As a result, the grid will not be required to use back-up generators. On
the other hand, if there is not enough number of consumers changing the
energy usage pattern, the price is increased, which in turn discourages the
consumers from continuing the usage. Consequently, the peak-demand is
reduced. Another method of load-demand management in the SG is the re-
mote appliance control. In this method, during emergency or when demand
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is high, appliances or devices are remotely turned off by the grid operators.
By collecting real-time information from the smart appliances, the SG of-
fers ubiquitous system monitoring and control mechanism, and facilitates
the transformation towards a self-healing and reliable power grid.
1.2 Electric Vehicles (EVs) in the SG
Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles (PHEVs) and Plug-in Electric Vehicles
(PEVs) are becoming popular due to their low pollution (green-house gas)
emissions, reduced dependency on petrolium or fossil fuel, potential utility
applications, and economy [9], [10], [11]. Both types of Electric Vehicles
(EVs) are capable of storing energy in on-board storage devices (i.e., bat-
tery) by plugging into the grid. PEVs are entirely powered by on-board bat-
teries, and PHEVs have an additional combustion engine along with the bat-
tery [12], [13]. In addition to the energy storage capacity, EVs are equipped
with power interface and computing platform with communication inter-
faces (e.g., Ethernet, USB, Bluetooth, and IEEE 802.11, etc.) [14]. As a
result, EVs can work as mobile energy storage devices [15] in the bidirec-
tional SG. As EVs are parked 95% of the time [16], they can charge their
batteries at night when the price is low and provide the energy back to the
grid during peak time or system contingency. This feature benefits both the
utilities and the consumers by reducing the cost of reserved generators and
utilizing dynamic pricing, respectively.
In the traditional electrical power system in the U.S., the cost associ-
ated with power outages is approximately 100 billion dollars per year [17],
due to the shortage of available energy. Renewable energy sources are a
potential substitute of the traditional fossil fuels. However, the cost and dif-
ficulties associated with building power plants based on a renewable source,
specially, in large metropolitan areas, have not produced the anticipated ef-
fects for renewable energy sources [1]. The introduction of large number
of EVs would be an accelerator of the energy crisis, however, the unique
characteristics of the EVs make them a potential solution too. The batter-
ies in the EVs can be powered by small renewable energy sources such as
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solar panels installed at home. The mobility and the bidirectional commu-
nication mechanism enable the EVs to sell the excessive electricity back
to the grid at various places and times. Moreover, as the market share of
EVs increases, the demand of petroleum by tradional vehicles will be re-
duced, making the automobile industry more environment-friendly. Due to
their fast charging/discharging capability, the EVs are considered as a po-
tential solution for spinning reserves and frequency regulation in the grid
[9]. These services are lucrative to the consumers, as the vehicles are paid
for their availability even if charging/discharging operation is not required
at a moment. As EVs are active 4% of the time in a day, the cumulative
payment for the other 96% results in a considerable benefit for the owner
[9]. As a result, EVs are considered as an integral part of the Distributed
Energy Resources (DER) in the SG.
1.2.1 Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) Communications
Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) communications enable the grid and the EVs to
interact and share information, and support the grid operators in monitor-
ing available capacity in real-time. V2G communications also help to co-
ordinate the charging/discharging events of EVs to maintain grid stability.
For example, an EV can store more than 10 kWh energy, which is equiva-
lent to the average energy demand per hour of 10 residential houses in the
U.S. If a large number of EVs start drawing energy simultaneously, the sud-
den electricity demand can create a mismatch between the generation and
load, thus, causing a deviation from the nominal grid operating frequency.
With the support of the V2G communcations, EVs can schedule charging
events depending on the availability in the grid. It is envisioned that Vehicle-
to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communications will
enable future EVs to be context-aware and avoid road accidents [14], and
participate in the road traffic management.
The security and privacy of Vehicular Communication (VC) systems are
imperative for the safety and reliability of the infrastructure and the cus-
tomers. For instance, roaming vehicles can frequently transmit data about
road constructions or obstructions, congestions, road accidents or hazards,
6
Figure 1.3: An abstract view of the vehicular communication [3]
etc. The data transmitted by the vehicles helps the road safety management
system to be more reliable and rapid [3]. Similar ideas have already been im-
plemented in mobile applications (e.g., Waze) to determine road conditions.
However, the advantages of the VC systems open doors for exploitation by
malicious entities. Malicious attackers can intercept messages transmitted
by vehicles to track their movement or transactions, breaching their privacy.
A compromised vehicle can transmit forged messages containing false in-
formation and mislead other vehicles to leave or follow a particular road,
causing traffic congestion. Fig. 1.3 shows an abstract view of the future
VC system considered in [3]. According to this concept, Road-Side Units
(RSU) act as the gateway of the vehicular network with the help of other
infrastructures (e.g., cellular network). Certification Authorities (CAs) are
in charge of managing the identities, credentials of the nodes (EV and RSU
) in a region (national territory, district, county, etc.). The secure V2V and
V2I communications comprise of VC-specific TCP/IP protocol stacks. The
presence of a CA is considered in the majority of the works addressing se-
curity and privacy of the EVs, in the literature. The functionality of the CA
enables a protocol to achieve basic security requirements such as confiden-
tiality, authentication, non-repudiation, etc. The confidentiality means the
content of a message is accessible only to the intended recipients [18]. Au-
thentication refers to the mechanism of confirming if a message or entity
is valid/authorized [18]. A CA in a network manages public keys of the
users and certifies them. A message encrypted with a certified public key
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of the receiver provides confidentiality. On the other hand, if a sender signs
a message with its own private key and the signature is verified as true, it
can prove the authenticity of the sender. The non-repudiation on the other
hand, prevents a sender from denying that s/he did not transmit the message
[18]. A message digitally signed by a sender provides non-repudiation to
the message if the public key of the sender is certified by a trusted CA.
The emerging smart grid communication infrastructure is envisioned to
accommodate the coordination of intelligent charging of EVs [19]. Based
on the seven domain model of the SG, authors in [4] have proposed a model
of EV charging infrastructure, as shown in Fig.1.4. According to this model,
an EV can charge its battery and participate in the V2G communication, by
being part of different networks. For instance, when it connects to the home
plug inside the residence of the owner, it acts as a part of the Home Area
Network (HAN). If it charges inside the building complex of the owner,
or a visiting home, it acts as a part of the Building Area Network (BAN)
or the host home network. An EV can also charge inside a commercial
(industrial) building, as a part of the Industry Area Network (IAN), or in a
public infrastructure, or third party power station. The electrical sensors and
smart meters at the charging stations are capable of collecting/exchanging
high-frequency data from/to the charging/discharging events and monitor in
real-time through two-way communication in the premise [10]. The authors
in [20] compared three wireless technologies based on their applicability
in the SG. The chosen technologies are HomePlug, ZigBee and cellular net-
work, and the comparison metrics are interference, power consumption, and
security. HomePlug devices do not require additional battery and are not
subject to other wireless traffic as they are powered through the wall outlet.
HomePlug is able to achieve high-speed broadband communications over
low-voltage power lines and faster than ZigBee or a cellular network. As a
result, it is suitable for a HAN. Zigbee devices have low power consump-
tion, and have a low device and installation cost, which make them suitable
for commercial deployment at large-scale charging facilities. An applica-
tion layer standard for ZigBee has already been developed, based on energy
profiles to support different devices, e.g., load control devices, EVs, etc.
[5]. Cellular network, on the other hand, provides long-range wireless data
8
Figure 1.4: Charging points for EVs in the SG [4]
network, which makes it suitable for roaming EVs [5], [20].
1.2.2 Charging and Discharging Events of EVs
The number of cars in the U.S. is approximately 250 million, and it is
predicted that by the year 2020, with a 10% penetration of EVs into the
industry will amount to an energy storage capacity of 500 GWh [10]. How-
ever, the large capacity and the large load can present EV as a “two-edged
sword” [3] to the utility. Works have shown that it will be difficult to control
customer behavior (i.e., driving and charging habits) completely, which in
turn may have adverse effects on the distribution system thermal loading,
voltage regulation, transformer balance, harmonic distortion levels, etc. [9],
[13]. Due to the large interconnection of the power grid, system failures
can affect a large geographical area if an abnormal condition is not resolved
quickly. As a result, EVs as energy consumers and suppliers are required to
respond quickly to power commands.
The charging management of EVs can be categorized into two types, 1)
centralized and 2) decentralized approach [13]. In the centralized approach,
a central entity (i.e., aggregator) uses direct control signals or indirect incen-
tives. As the control signals, electricity price (day-ahead or threshold price)
is used to shift charging requests of EVs from peak-hours to off-peak hours.
This type of utility coordinated charging of EVs through the V2G commu-
nications, known as “smart charging”, is designed to facilitate load-demand
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management in the SG [9]. Considering real-world constraints (e.g., com-
munication and infrastructure variations among individual vehicles), a cen-
tralized aggregator can regulate multiple battery loads from a cluster of EVs,
and maximize customer satisfaction and minimize grid disturbances [10], si-
multaneously. In comparison to the amount of energy required for a power
grid regulation, the energy stored by an individual EV is small. A small
energy storage needs frequent charging/discharging operations to offer an
ancillary service. Therefore, a large energy storage is more suitable for grid
regulations [21]. The control operator can set a minimum ‘bid size’ as the
required energy for regulation which in turn meets the time of availabil-
ity. As a result, if a utility works as a ‘middleman’ between the EVs and
the grid, it needs to aggregate multiple EVs to offer ancillary services (e.g.,
voltage control, frequency regulation, regulation reserve, spinning reserve,
and non-spinning reserve) [10]. Similarly, in a decentralized approach, EVs
optimize their charging schedules based on the broadcasted price signal.
This approach requires V2V communication to maintain aggregated charg-
ing behavior within the distribution grid constraints [13].
In both of the approaches, the grid operator requires the knowledge of
current demand to determine the grid constraints. Moreover, the stability of
power grid is maintained by performing hourly power regulation to prevent
generation capacity from ramping up or down from the nominal level. As a
result, the EVs are required to frequently transmit certain information to the
grid. Some of the motivations behind the collection of real-time data from
the EVs, found in the existing literature, are summarized below.
• The current electric power distribution grid cannot support the pre-
dicted increase in load-demand introduced by the EVs [12]. Optimiza-
tion methods for the distribution grid constraints require the collection
of high-frequency data from the EVs [13].
• The grid monitoring and quick response to emergencies require utility
companies to collect information from the connected entities [13].
• The V2G communication facilitates the integration and energy man-
agement of renewable energy sources. The projected peak power load
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of the EVs is at solar noon and the peak grid load is at mid-to-late af-
ternoon [10]. The V2G communication can facilitate shifting of charg-
ing/discharging of EVs to coincide with periods of strong wind or sun,
before they can be used as energy backup [22].
• The work in [23] shows that the addition of EVs and V2G communica-
tions into the power system reduces carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.
• The remotely controlled smart charging of EVs is performed based on
grid conditions and user preferences. Information transmitted by the
EVs, such as time-of-use and real-time price, minimizes the billing
cost for charging [23].
• By collecting information about energy demand and time to charge, the
grid operators can shift charging schedules from peak-hour to maintain
the grid stability.
• EVs work as the DER in the SG by working as reserved energy sources
during system contingencies, peak-hour or during islanding. Islanding
in a power grid happens, when a small geographical area gets discon-
nected from the main grid. If EVs work as the DER, the cost associated
with the reserved generators in the traditional grid is avoided [24]. The
V2G communication enables the coordination of DERs in a microgrid.
• The ancillary services provided by the EVs require the exchange of
large volume of information between the vehicle, the charging station,
and the utility for efficient power transaction between the EV and the
grid.
• Uncoordinated and random charging of EVs can make the demand side
management challenging by causing power loss, overloads, voltage
fluctuations, degraded system efficiency and sub-optimal generation
dispatch. The development of V2G infrastructure will provide a high-
speed bidirectional communication network for effective coordination
of transmission, distribution, and end-user assets [19].
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1.2.3 Privacy of EVs
The operational decisions of the SG depend on the information trans-
mitted by the entities connected to it. For instance, the variable price of-
fered by the dynamic pricing feature depends on the current load-demand
condition of the grid. Whereas, the load-demand condition is determined
from the information collected from the customer and generation domains.
The pervasive monitoring and control mechanism of the SG utilize infor-
mation collected from the devices such as transformers, feeders, etc. and
provide early detection and isolation of faults in the transmission and dis-
tribution domains. Automated control is a distinctive feature of the SG,
where devices are controlled remotely in case of an abnormal condition.
The anomaly is detected from the transmitted information of the devices, by
finding the deviation of behavior from the nominal condition. The promis-
ing features of the information-centric SG have accelerated the transforma-
tion from the traditional power system. However, the information trans-
mitted by the consumers poses threat to privacy of the end-users and has
stirred protests against the roll-out of the SG [1]. The NIST has identified
privacy as one of the seven major challenges to be addressed before the full
deployment of the SG [25].
In a V2G communication, the grid operator frequently transmits infor-
mation such as power commands, dynamic price, charging rate and time,
charging/discharging location, etc., to the EVs. Depending on the infor-
mation, EVs schedule a charging/discharging event with a charging station,
at a specified time. The scheduling requires the EVs to transmit informa-
tion such as State-of-Charge (SoC), current location, speed, a valid identity,
expected time of arrival, etc. However, the information transmitted by the
EVs can pose threats to the privacy of the owner of the vehicle. It is pos-
sible by the electricity provider, data aggregator or a network of charging
stations to extract personal information of the owner of the vehicle, such
as the place of residence, travel patterns, time to leave for office, visit to
a hospital, and create customer profiles [14]. Authors in [1] discusses the
typical data transmitted in a V2G network and the type of data considered
as privacy-sensitive, as shown in Table 1.1. The data associated with the
12
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billing services, security or control commands are required for the function-
ality of both the EV and the grid, and is not considered as sensitive cus-
tomer information. On the other hand, ID, location, access control policy,
and payment and tariff data are the four types of data considered as privacy-
sensitive in this paper. In the load-demand optimization method proposed
in [13], Charging Service Providers (CSPs) collect and store historical trip
data, customer information and billing information of the EVs. The his-
torical trip data includes time-of-departure for a trip, time-of-arrival from a
trip, state-of-energy at time-of-departure, state-of-energy at time-of-arrival,
location at time-of-arrival, location at the end of the trip, etc. Based on these
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data, a CSP is able to predict near-future trips of the customer EVs.
The information transmitted by an EV, during the charging/discharging
session, can be used by an adversary to pinpoint the position of a customer
[19]. The utilities in the SG provide data management services such as data
collection, aggregation, storage, and publication. The high-frequency data
collection for grid monitoring yields a large amount of data, which may
contain user information, charging strategies, locations, and billing infor-
mation. The storage cost associated with the large amount of data is high.
Utility companies and appliance manufacturers can sell these information
to third parties for benefit, which can be considered as sensitive to the cus-
tomers [1]. The peer competition may motivate a utility company to cre-
ate customer profiles by analyzing these data, for advertizing purposes [1].
Moreover, individual employees can spy on the data of some customers.
Additionally, the risk of data leakage by malicious hackers is always there.
In the SG, EVs work as both customer and service provider by charging
and discharging, respectively. As a customer, the personal information of
an EV needs to be hidden from the utility and as a service provider, its
customers should not know who provides the service [1]. Nevertheless, the
information required for grid functionality needs to be provided to the utility
companies, whereas, customers’ right to keep their data private should also
be preserved.
In the existing literature, it is recommended to employ different pseudo-
nyms for different transactions by an EV to provide anonymity to its owner
[14]. The use of pseudonyms for data transmission prevents correlation
of sensitive information to the original identity of the customer even if the
data is compromised. However, an authentication mechanism is required to
ensure that only valid EVs participate in the charging events. Otherwise,
malicious entities can schedule charging/discharging events randomly with-
out participating in the event. The authentication mechanism requires that
no entity have enough information to correlate different transactions to an
EV. Therefore, the majority of the privacy-preserving protocols for EVs in
the literature are based on anonymous authentication mechanism [16], [26],
[27], [28], [29], [30].
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1.3 Thesis Objectives
In this thesis, a privacy-preserving method is developed to achieve loca-
tion privacy of EVs and to enable a Charging Station (CS) to check the au-
thenticity of an anonymous pseudonym used in a transaction. The anonymity
of the proposed work is achieved partly by the use of Blind Digital Sig-
nature (BDS) method and Partially Blind Signature (PBS) method. Addi-
tionally, the proposed method addresses flexible charging schedules for the
EVs. Missing a pre-scheduled charging event by an EV causes monetary
loss to the CSs or electricity provider. As a result, in the existing litera-
ture, an EV not arriving in a scheduled event is considered as malicious
and the corresponding EV is penalized (e.g., blacklisted, or refused further
services) [27]. However, missing a scheduled event can happen due to dif-
ferent valid reasons such as road obstruction, road accident, GPS taking a
different route, etc. Additionally, a vehicle is usually owned by a customer
for long period of time and being refused from further services for miss-
ing a charging event will prevent benefits to both the customer and the grid.
Flexibility in scheduling can encourage more consumer participation in the
demand management of the grid. On the other hand, the CSs should also get
compensation for the missed charging/discharging events. A mechanism is
required which balances flexible charging events for the EVs and monetary
loss to the CSs. In the proposed method, EVs can schedule charging events
for a timing window. The EVs arriving at the pre-scheduled window, can
normally perform charging operation. On the other hand, the EVs which
arrive earlier or later than the pre-scheduled window, can still authenticate
and participate in the charging event, but, with a penalty cost paid to the CS.
Additionally, a network setup that sub-divides a regional area into smaller
zones is proposed to prevent service providers in the SG from having enough
information to breach privacy of EVs.
The experimental results presented in this work are based on a MATLAB
simulation. The arrivals of the EVs are assumed to follow a Poisson distri-
bution and the achieved anonymity is represented by a metric named Degree
of Anonymity (DoA) proposed in [31]. The simulation results are used to
study the following aspects of the proposed work,
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1. The variation of achieved anonymity in different stages (i.e., pre-arrival,
timing window, and post-arrival) of the proposed method with respect
to (w.r.t.) the arrival rates.
2. The cost-effective number of missed CSs allowable for an EV w.r.t.
real-time and dynamic electricity pricing. The cost-effective number
of CSs means the maximum number of CSs an EV can miss on its route
and provide penalty cost to them while balancing the energy cost.
3. A method of sub-dividing a regional area into groups of EVs based on
the arrival rates of EVs in the area. The goal of the sub-division is to
achieve a preferred threshold DoA defined by the achieved DoA in an
ideal scenario.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work on privacy of EVs ad-
dressing flexible scheduling of charging events and presenting a formal anal-
ysis of DoA to address the aspects stated above.
1.4 Organization of the Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses re-
lated works in the literature. The discussed related works include different
proposed privacy-preserving methods and network setups. Chapter 3 de-
scribes the methods from the existing literature which are used in this work,
such as the BDS method, PBS method and DoA. Chapter 4 discusses the
system model considered in this work, such as network setup, adversarial
model and the assumptions. Chapter 5 describes the steps of the proposed
privacy-preserving method. The simulation results are presented in chapter





2.1 Privacy-Preserving Methods for EVs
The privacy preserving protocols for EVs found in the literature are based
on anonymous authentication methods. To achieve location privacy, it is
recommended in [14] that EVs use different authenticated pseudonyms for
different transactions, and the pseudonyms should not be associated with
the original identity of its owner, except by a regional or national authority
[14]. However, different methods focus on different aspects such as revo-
cable anonymity for malicious EVs, batch authentication to reduce delay,
authentication based on battery status, context-awareness, etc.
The authors in [26] have identified the privacy issues associated with
the V2G interactions and proposed a reward-based incentive mechanism
for EVs working as service provider. In this method, the EVs use permits
generated with an ID-based partially blind digital signature method [28].
The permit is used for anonymous transactions with a local aggregator. It
is suggested that the EVs receive the payments in E-cash which should be
used in exchange of maintenance services of the vehicle. This method aims
to achieve privacy of an EV as service provider when it provides ancillary
services to the grid. However, this method does not address privacy of an
EV as a consumer against the energy utility.
In [32], the authors propose an anonymous protocol for roaming EVs.
This method addresses charging by multiple users of the same vehicle and
fair billing to different hosts of electricity. The EVs receive signed pseudonyms
from the electricity supplier, utilizes the pseudonyms to authenticate to a CS
and generates anonymous billing statements. Thus, the identity of the owner
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is hidden from the CS. However, in this method, the electricity supplier of
an EV can correlate its pseudonyms, charging sessions and original identity.
In [27], an anonymous authentication method is proposed in which the
anonymity of malicious EVs can be revoked. In the network setup consid-
ered in this paper, the EVs register with a Certificate Authority (CA), and
a Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). The encrypted ID of the EV is
shared with these two entities with a threshold secret sharing scheme such
that two out of three shares can be used to recover the ID. The EV receives
a certificate from the CA, which is used to collect tokens and pseudonyms
from a CS. The pseudonyms are used to schedule and participate in a charg-
ing event, thus, the identity of the EV is hidden from the CS. If the EV does
not arrive at a pre-scheduled time, it is considered as malicious. The CA
and the DMV recover the identity of this “now labeled” malicious EV and
the EV is blacklisted. The proposed method assumes that the DMV and the
CA are always online and the CA needs to participate in the protocol every
time an EV charges. The revocation mechanism assumes that not arriving
at the scheduled time always means that the vehicle is malicious.
A privacy-preserving authentication protocol named Portunes+ for dy-
namic contactless EV charging is proposed in [33]. Dynamic contactless
charging enables moving EVs to charge while driving with contiguous charg-
ing pads installed in a roadbed. The system considered in this paper consists
of Charging Service Providers (CSP), charging Pad Owners (PO) and Elec-
tric Vehicles (EVs). This paper addresses fast authentication mechanism
between an EV and a charging section, and considers the CSP and the PO
as trusted entities. The EVs use pseudonyms in the transactions to achieve
privacy against external attackers. However, this method does not address
privacy against internal entities.
Authors in [16] propose a batch authentication protocol to meet the strin-
gent timing requirement in a V2G communication. In this paper, control
centers perform real-time monitoring of the grid and an aggregator collects
data and manages charging/discharging events of EVs. The EVs are consid-
ered as both consumer and supplier of energy. The proposed method allows
the aggregator to check the authenticity of a batch of EVs before they par-
ticipate in an event. However, this method does not address privacy of EVs
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against the aggregator.
In [29], an authentication method based on different battery statuses (i.e.,
charging, discharging, or fully charged) is proposed. The EVs can play
the role as energy provider or consumer, and their power transmission and
communication to the grid are established via an aggregator. The roles of
an EV depends on battery status, e.g., energy provider when fully charged,
and consumer when charging. Depending on the role, the EVs transmit and
receive different types of information to/from the aggregator. Considering
these factors, this paper proposes three interlinked authentication protocols
to achieve privacy of the EV. This method assumes the presence of a trusted
Central Authority (CA) which participates in all the communications and
performs billing services.
In [30], an anonymous authentication protocol is proposed to achieve pri-
vacy of EVs and generate anonymous receipts for energy transactions. An
EV collects blind signature on tokens from the electric utility and gener-
ates pseudonyms for each token. To establish keys for the pseudonyms, this
method requires the EVs to use high latency anonymizer such as MIX or
TOR. Additionally, to generate anonymous receipts, the EVs are required to
use group signatures or anonymous network (e.g., TOR). However, this re-
quirement demands significant change in the communication infrastructure,
or computationally intensive or time consuming operations by the EVs.
The work in [19] proposes a Real-Time Smart Load Management (RT-
SLM) algorithm for coordinating charging activities of groups of EVs. The
RT-SLM algorithm focuses on reducing system stress impacting grid relia-
bility, security and performance while enabling EVs to perform fast charg-
ing. This algorithm addresses cost minimization and voltage profile im-
provement and does not address privacy of the EVs.
Authors in [11] propose a decentralized authentication mechanism for
Plug-in Electric Vehicle (PEV) to address the issues associated with cen-
tralized authentication systems. However, the adversarial model considered
in this paper includes external attackers. The proposed method does not
address privacy against internal entities or service providers.
An authentication method based on partially blind digital signature and
certificateless public key cryptography is proposed in [34]. In this method,
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EVs use pseudonyms to communicate with local aggregator before access-
ing V2G network to achieve privacy. However, this approach does not con-
sider roaming mode of EVs.
The authentication protocol proposed in [35] considers EVs in home
mode and visiting mode, which is similar to the method proposed in this
work. However, this method requires the presence of a virtual battery vehi-
cle for the privacy preservation. Moreover, this work does not consider the
flexibility of charging schedules for roaming EVs and differs in the authen-
tication mechanism.
2.2 Network Setups and Adversarial Models Considered
in the Literature
The NIST introduced an abstract model for smart grid infrastructure in
[7]. The works in the literature considers different network models based on
the goal and adversarial model of the proposed methods. The mechanism
of an anonymous authentication method depends on the adversarial model.
Depending on the adversarial model, entities in a network setup are con-
sidered as trusted or adversary. Some methods in the literature considers
entities in the network setup as trusted and not deviating from the protocol
(e.g., [33]). In some methods, entities are considered as semi-trusted or un-
trustworthy, which do not have enough information to breach privacy (e.g.,
[27]).
The V2G communication system considered in [36] is comprised by
three entities: users, network nodes, and authorities. Authorities are trusted
entities which issue and manage the identities and credentials for other en-
tities in the network. Users are the owner or individuals operating the EVs.
Network nodes are the processes that run on the computing devices (e.g.,
Road-Side Units (RSUs), EVs, etc.) with wireless communication capabil-
ity.
Authors in [11] proposed a peer-to-peer cross-certification method for
communication between power systems across international borders to en-
able each authority to achieve maximum control over its own territory. The
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multi-domain network architecture in this paper considers the presence of
an aggregator which works as the liaison between EVs and energy suppli-
ers. It is assumed that the CSs are involved in constant communication with
the aggregator. The network setup also considers the presence of an Inde-
pendent System Operator (ISO) or a Regional Transmission Organization
(RTO), and Energy Service Providers (ESPs). The ISO/RTO operates and
controls the bulk power system, and the ESPs supply electricity to the con-
sumer domain. The aggregator assembles groups of EVs and coordinates
with other entities, to provide DER services. To enable the ISO/RTO to val-
idate the transactions of the EVs, the aggregator is assumed to be able to
identify locations of the EVs.
The method in [5] considers a V2G network consisting of Battery Ve-
hicles (BVs), Local Aggregators (LAGs), and a Central Authority (CA). A
LAG communicates with the power distribution network and works as the
service access point for the BVs. A LAG collects information from the BVs
and manages the charging/discharging events, monitors power status, and
schedules the load.
The work in [13] proposes a centralized approach for charging of EVs.
The entities considered in this approach are a Charging Service Provider
(CSP) or EV aggregator, a Distributed System Operator (DSO) and an Elec-
tricity Retailer (RET). The DSO is in charge of managing the distribution
grid to avoid overloading. Also, depending on the power usage propositions
of the RET and the information of grid congestion transmitted by the DSO,
the CSP schedules individual charging events for the EVs. Depending on
the information transmitted by the customer vehicles, the CSP determines
a preferred aggregated load curve. The preferred aggregated load curve is
then used to minimize energy cost, as well as, to avoid grid congestion. This
work proposes that the CSP can work as a RET if it does not have sufficient
number of EVs to bid for ancillary services.
In [37], the entities considered in the V2G interaction are the grid oper-
ators, the energy providers, the aggregators and the EVs. The aggregators
are considered as the adversary and this method considers collusion among
multiple aggregators to find the identity of the owner of an EV. The adver-
sarial model considered in [32] consists of the CSs. An Electricity Supplier
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(ES) is considered as a trusted entity, which is aware of a charging session
of an EV and provides signed pseudonyms to the EVs for anonymous trans-
actions with the CSs. In [27], the entities considered in the framework are
a Certificate Authority (CA), a Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), the
EVs and the CSs. Both the CA and the DMV participate in the vehicle
registration, pseudonym collection and signing. The DMV and the CA are
semi-trusted, that is, both of them need to cooperate to recover the identity
of the owner of an EV. The identity of the EV is hidden from the CS and
can be revoked by the DMV and the CA, in case of malicious behavior. The
network model in [26] considers a Central Aggregator (CAG), Local Aggre-
gators (LAGs), individual Battery Vehicles (BVs), and a Trusted Authority
(TA). The LAGs monitor groups of BVs and the CA participates in the load-
demand management of the grid. The TA is trusted by all the other parties.
There is no direct trust relationship between individual BVs and the CAG
or the LAGs, as they belong to different organizations. On the other hand,
the method proposed in [33] considers Charging Service Providers (CSP),
charging Pad Owners (PO) and EVs in the network setup, where CSP and




3.1 Blind Digital Signature
The Blind Digital Signature (BDS) method [38] enables a user to get
signature on a message without revealing the content of the message to the
signer. In a fully blind signature method, a signer knows nothing about the
message [1]. In this subsection, a BDS method based on the RSA encryption
scheme is described.
Suppose, the signer has a (public, private) key pair (pk, sk) for signing
purposes only, where pk is publicly known, and sk is known only to the
signer. According to the RSA algorithm, a signature on a message m is
σ(m) = mskmod N , where N is publicly known. If a verifier needs to
check the signature, σ(m) is raised to the signer’s public key pk. Due to the
relation between a public-private key pair generated by RSA algorithm, a
valid signature follows, (σ(m))pkmodN = (msk)pkmodN = mmodN .
In the BDS method, the user generates a random value r such that gcd(r,
N) = 1. Here, r works as a blinding factor to mask the original message,
i.e., masked(m) = m × rpk modN . The signer signs the masked message
instead of the original message. As a result, the content of the message is
hidden from the signer.
σ(masked(m)) = (masked(m))skmodN
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The user unblinds the signed masked message and extracts the signed orig-
inal message as follows.
σ(m) = σ(masked(m))× r−1modN
= (m× rpk)sk × r−1modN
= msk × r × r−1modN
= mskmodN
Blind signatures can be classified into two categories, 1) Certificate (CA)-
based: a CA generates key pairs for the entities in the network, and 2) ID-
based: the ID of an entity is used as the public key. The implementation of
BDS methods in V2G networks is simple, and the communication overload
depends on the complexity of the authentication process [1]. In this work,
the theory of a BDS method is used in the pseudonym and token generation
process, to achieve anonymity. However, the simulation results do not in-
clude the implementation of BDS method and its impact on the computation
and communication process.
3.2 Partially Blind Signature
The Partially Blind Signature (PBS) method [39] is a variant of the BDS
method. This method differs from BDS such that the signer and the user
can agree on a common message [1]. The signature is done on the common
message and the blinded message. Suppose, info is the agreed common in-
formation. A public hash function is used to transform info into a random
public key, i.e., pk′ = hash(info), whose private key is not known publicly.
The signer signs the blinded message and hash(info) with its private key,
sk. The signatures are bound to the public key pk. As a result, hash(info)
is also bound to the signature but remains unblind [39]. In restrictive par-
tially blind signature methods, the message needs to follow rules agreed by
the signer and the user.
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3.3 Degree of Anonymity
The definition of privacy adopted by the NIST is “The right to be left
alone” [25]. However, a metric is required to quantify the privacy (or,
anonymity) achieved in different scenarios or methods. According to the
definition of Pfitzmann and Köhntopp, anonymity is to be unidentifiable
within an anonymity set [40]. Anonymity set is the set of users with a pos-
sibility of performing an action in a system, i.e., senders, receivers, or, in
this case, charging/discharging EVs. A user’s probability of being in the
anonymity set is assigned by an adversary. This is because, based on the
behavior of the users in a system, every user has a probability of doing an
action, perceived by the adversary.
Degree of Anonymity (DoA) is a metric representing the level of anony-
mity achieved by the users of an anonymous system. The authors in [41]
have defined the DoA as 1 − p, where p is the probability assigned by the
adversary to a user. In other terms, if a user has the probability p (perceived
by the adversary) of doing an action, then s/he has 1 − p probability of not
doing it. Hence, the user gets a DoA of 1 − p against the adversary. If
p = 1, for doing an action by a user, then s/he has a DoA= 0 and no privacy
in the system. However, this metric represents the anonymity achieved by
an individual user in the system. Therefore, it is not useful to represent
the comparative anonymity achieved by the entities in the anonymity set
[42]. For example, according to this metric, if user i has pi < 0.5, s/he
supposedly has a good anonymity. However, if all the other users have
probability p < pi, user i is the most probable of doing an action, thus,
achieves the worst anonymity in the system.
Authors in [43] have defined the DoA as log2(N), where N is the total
number of users in the system. According to this metric, all the users in a
system achieve the same anonymity. This metric assumes that the adversary
only has the knowledge of the value of N and the probabilities associated
with the users is considered as 1N . This metric does not consider the impact
of probabilistic information obtained by an adversary in different types of
attacks [42], which can impact the DoA achieved by individual users.
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Authors in [42] and [31] proposed DoA metrics based on Shannon’s def-
inition of entropy [44]. In general, entropy refers to the uncertainty within
a system or event. According to Shannon, entropy is the maximum limit on
the average length of a lossless compression of an information source [44].
In other words, the Shannon entropy indicates the maximum number of bits
required to represent a message without loss. The entropy of a discrete ran-






where i represents every possible value taken by X and N is the total num-
ber of values taken by X .
In the metrics proposed in [42] and [31], the entropy H(X) is used to
represent the information contained by a system after an attack has taken
place. In these metrics, pi is the probability of user i being in the anonymity
set (perceived by the adversary), where,
N∑
i=1
pi = 1 (as the summation of
probabilities of performing an action by the users in a system is 1). A system
achieves maximum anonymity when all the entities in the system have equal
probability of performing an action. So, the maximum entropy a system can
achieve is,
Hmax(X) = log2(N)[when pi = pj... = pN ] (3.2)
(3.2) is also the metric for DoA considered in [43]. The information learned
by the adversary after an attack (or, observation) is Hmax(X) − H(X). In
[31], the DoA is defined as,




On the other hand, in [42], the DoA is represented after normalizing by the
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maximum entropy, as shown below.












The metrics in (3.3) and (3.4) are applicable for cases when the entities in
the anonymity set have different probabilities.
In a system of N users, if an adversary isolates S number of entities
as possible members of the anonymity set, then, the other N − S entities
have zero probability of performing an action. If each of the S entities has
equal probability, the DoA of the system will be log2(S) (according to [31])
or log2(S)log2(N) (according to [42]). The normalized DoA metric is useful for
comparing a system with an ideal anonymous system [42]. An anonymous
system is considered as ideal when the only information known to an ad-
versary is the number of users in the system. The normalized DoA metric
represents how much information is leaked in different attacks compared to
the ideal situation. However, in this work, the metric proposed in [31] is
used, i.e.,
DoA = log2(S)[ pi = pj = ... = pS] (3.5)
This is because, as EVs are roaming entities, the maximum number of en-
tities in a particular region is random (i.e., N is variable). Moreover, the
probabilities of different entities depend on the type of attack [42] and the
method proposed in this thesis does not focus on the impact of different at-
tacks on the anonymity. As a result, it is assumed that all the entities in the
anonymity set have equal probability. This metric depends on the size of the
anonymity set, i.e., the larger the anonymity set the higher the DoA. Ideally,
in a V2G communication using pseudonyms, it should be impossible for any
observer to distinguish between the EVs in a charging/discharging event as




4.1 Network Setup and Adversarial Model
In the electrical power grid, usually a single Electric Utility (EU) pro-
vides services to groups of consumers in a regional area [26]. For example,
according to the Department of Public Service in New York state, in the city
of Syracuse, Pennsylvania, and Rochester, electricity is supplied by the Na-
tional Grid, the Pennsylvania Electric Company, and the Rochester Gas &
Electric Corp., respectively. The EU in a region perform the billing, energy
supply, maintenance services for its customers. In this paper, it is assumed
that every EV is subscribed to an EU which is referred to as the primary EU
(EUpr) for its subscribers. An EUpr is interested in providing services to its
own customers, hence, it manages the charging events of its subscriber EVs
by communicating with different CSs. The charging events are performed
at different geographically dispersed CSs which receive the energy from the
EU in its region. For a roaming EV, when it moves to an area which is su-
pervised by another EU other than its EUpr, this EU is referred to as the
visited EU (EUv) for this EV.
In the proposed method, an EV schedules a charging event via an EU.
However, the aim is to prevent any service provider (i.e., an EU, or a CS)
from correlating the charging events of an EV to its owner’s identity. In
the proposed method, every regional area under the supervision of an EUpr
is further divided into zones of smaller areas. Each zone is supervised by
a subsidiary entity (EUsub). All the EUsubs in a region are maintained by
the EUpr of that region. However, the division of a large area into smaller
zones denotes the division of information system (e.g., database, servers,
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Figure 4.1: An example of the proposed network setup
etc.) rather than the electricity service. The motivations behind the subdivi-
sion are, 1) micro-management of smaller zones for efficient operation, 2)
better scalability, 3) limited access to information of EVs, thus, better pri-
vacy and anonymity, etc. In the heterogeneous power system, sometimes,
companies are integrated vertically and become part of a single entity [13]
as it reduces communication overload. In this case, the different companies
provide different services to the customers. However, entity owning the
companies can possibly possess the information owned by the individual
companies.
According to the proposed network setup, every regional EUpr has sub-





sub supervise zone 1, zone 2 and zone 3, respec-
tively. The scheduling of charging events in each zone is managed by its
supervising EUsub. In other words, when an EV moves from one zone to
another zone to participate in charging events, the management of the event
is ‘handed over’ to a new EUsub. On the other hand, the CSs in a different
regional area receive energy services from the supervising EU in that area.
Hence, when a roaming EV moves from one regional area to another, the
scheduling of events is handed over to the visited EU (EUv). In the proposed
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method, an EUpr provides the authentication credentials to its valid cus-
tomers to communicate with an EUsub or an EUv, and the EUv provides the
required credentials to the valid roaming EVs to schedule charging events
with the CSs under its supervision. In this hierarchical approach, each entity
(an EUv, an EUsub, or a CS) is capable of checking the authenticity of an
EV participating in a charging event without knowing the original identity
of its owner.
Fig. 4.1 shows an example of the proposed network setup in this work.
An EV participates in charging events at different CSs on its route. In this
figure, the CSs are situated in different zones (i.e., zone i, zone j, zone k





sub). Different zones are part of a larger regional area
and the EUsubs in different zones are supervised by the EUpr in the regional
area (i.e., EUpr and EUv).
The majority of the work in the literature considers the presence of a
data aggregator which collects information from the entities in the grid and
provides the data to the utilities such as EU, grid operator, etc. However,
the scheduling of charging events in the proposed method does not include
interaction between an EV and the aggregator. Hence, an aggregator is not
included in the network setup considered in this work.
The adversarial model considers the EU and the CS as internal and honest-
but-curious adversaries [36]. Internal adversaries are equipped with cer-
tain credentials and they participate in the execution of protocols [36]. The
honest-but-curious model assumes that these entities do not deviate from the
specified protocol but are interested in finding information about the owner
of an EV. The EU, and the CS are part of the same or different organizations.
4.2 Assumptions
1. The entities in the network setup are equipped with trusted compo-
nents, i.e., built-in hardware and firmware capable of performing cryp-
tographic operations [36].
2. Standard security protocols are followed in the communication among
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the entities. For example, transmitted messages are encrypted with a
reliable encryption scheme (e.g., AES), mutual keys are set up with a
secure key setup protocol (e.g., Implicitly Authenticated DHKE proto-
col), etc. The security standards also depend on the underlying proto-
col. For instance, Zigbee Smart Energy specification recommends em-
ploying Elliptical Curve Cryptography (ECC) in cryptographic authen-
tication and key generation for secure, efficient, and low-bandwidth
networking.
3. The simulation considers the arrival of EVs as a random Poisson dis-
tribution. The charging events follow a standard M/M/1 queue system.
The impact of factors such as electricity price, time of the day (i.e.,
peak/off-peak hour), load-demand condition, etc., on the arrival rate is
not considered in the experiment.
4. An EV and its owner are considered as the same entity, and these two
terms are used interchangeably.
5. There are more than one EV requesting the scheduling of charging
events to an EU, (i.e., EUpr, EUsub, or EUv). This assumption is
practical, as the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) projects that
by the year of 2050, 62% of the vehicles in the U.S. will consist of
PHEVs/PEVs [9]. In many countries, the transformation towards EVs
is emphasized. For example, in the U.K., it is announced that new gas
or disel fueled vehicles will not be allowed after year 2040. The to-
tal EV penetration is predicted to be small, however, the possibility of
localized concentrations is high. The study in [45] concludes that EV
loads are likely to be clustered in certain areas.
6. The individual EVs own multiple tokens or pseudonyms to achieve
anonymity. Each of the tokens or the pseudonyms should have sep-
arate certified public keys so that no transaction can be linked to the
original identity of the owner. Different credentials are used for differ-
ent transactions. These are standard assumptions in the literature [3],
[27].
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7. Tasks such as cetification, authenticating public keys, etc. require the
presence of a Certification Authority (CA) which is recognized and
trusted by the entities in the network. In this work, the presence of the
CA is implicit and assumed to follow procedures as specified by the




In this chapter, the different phases in the proposed method of scheduling
flexible charging events are described. The method aims to enable the EVs
to anonymously communicate with different entities other than its EUpr
(i.e., an EUsub, an EUv or a CS), and simultaneously enable the entities
to check its authenticity. An EUpr provides the authentication credentials
to its subscribed EVs for this purpose. An EV is considered as valid if it is
registered with an electric utility. As a result, the signature of an EUpr on
an EV’s credentials is verified by a network entity to check the authentic-
ity of an anonymous vehicle. An EUpr participates in the signing process
of anonymous tokens for its registered EVs or a valid roaming EV, to en-
able it to communicate with an EUsub under its supervision. On the other
hand, EUsubs participate in the signing of pseudonyms of an authentic EV
to enable it to communicate with the CSs under its supervision. The flexible
charging method enables the EVs to participate in charging events with CSs
within a scheduled timing window as well as before and after the scheduled
timing window. Fig. 5.1 shows the sequence of events participated by an
EV and the corresponding network entities, in the proposed method.
Registration and Token Collection: We assume that after a customer
purchases an EV, the vehicle is registered with an EU as a valid energy sub-
scriber with its original information such as the owner’s name, address, Ve-
hicle Identification Number (VIN), etc. After the registration, an EV and its
EUpr agree on the authentication credentials (i.e., ID and password for on-
line account, mutual keys, etc.) for future communication. The scheduling
of charging events is done via different EUsubs and an EV uses an authenti-
cated token to anonymously communicate with an EUsub. The EV receives
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Figure 5.1: Steps taken by an EV and the associated service providers in different phases
of the proposed method
the list of supervising EUsubs of different zones from the EUpr. Further-
more, it is assumed that the owner of an EV knows about its approximate
movement in the upcoming days. This means the owner is aware of the bat-
tery status, the need for charging and the tentative route along which s/he
prefers to charge the vehicle.
After selecting a route, depending on the price information received from
the grid and the SoC, the owner of the EV decides on the timing window
and the preferred zone for charging. The preferred zone for charging is not
necessarily the first zone in the route selected by a customer. The selection
of preferred zone depends on the battery status of the EV and price of elec-
tricity at time of arrival at a CS. If a route selected by an EV goes through
x number of zones, it requires maximum x number of random tokens (Φsub)
for the EUsubs in these zones. Two cases of token collection for a route are
considered: 1) the first preferred zone is under the supervision of the EUpr,
or 2) the first preferred zone is under the supervision of an EU in a differ-
ent region. In both cases, the EV generates a random token and blinds it
with a random value. The EV and the EUpr mutually agree on a common
Info, which includes the time frame for which the token is valid. The va-
lidity time frame of the token is different from the timing window (TW) for
charging and should be long enough to allow an EV to schedule charging
events within its planned trip. Next, the EUpr signs the masked token and
the common Info with a PBS method. In the first case, the signed token
is used to communicate with the EUsub in the first preferred zone. In the
second case, the signed token is used to communicate with the visiting EU
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Figure 5.2: Steps followed by an EV in the registration and token collection phase
(EUv). Fig. 5.2 depicts the steps followed in this phase.
Selection of CSs: If the preferred CS is situated in a zone under the
supervision of the EUpr of the EV, it sends an authentication request to the
EUsub for scheduling a charging event.
EV → EUsub : Req(sch)||Φsub||Tval||σEUpr(Φsub||Tval)
where, Req(sch) contains the information required for scheduling (e.g., re-
quired energy, ε, timing window, TW for charging, route information, etc.),
Φsub is the token for the EUsub, Tval is the time frame during which the to-
ken is valid, and σEUpr indicates that the contents are signed by the EUpr
supervising this area.
The EUsub checks the signature of its supervising EUpr and the validity
of the token. Next, the EUsub checks the availability of energy within the
TW at the CSs in its zone. Depending on the availability, congestion of
charging events, or predicted load-demand conditions, the EUsub selects a
set of available CSs. Suppose, the CSs are recognized by different identifiers
(IDCS), which are unique in an area. The Esub creates a message (Mcs)
consisting of ε, TW , and IDCS for each of the available CSs, and sends the
messages to the EUpr. The EUpr signs the messages using its private key
and sends them back to the EUsub.
σEUpr(Mcs) = σEUpr(ε||TW ||IDCS)
Next, the EUsub sends the Mcs and the signed Mcs to the EV.
If the first zone is under the supervision of a different supervising EU
(EUv), the EV authenticates itself to the EUv using the token signed from
its EUpr. The EUv provides the required credentials to communicate with
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Figure 5.3: Steps in the selection of CSs phase
the EUsubs under its supervision. The communication with the EUsubs in
the visited zone follows the same procedure as described before. Fig. 5.3
shows the steps followed in the selection of CSs phase, where, the events
are executed according to the order of the numbers on the arrows following
them. The tasks in the square boxes are performed by the corresponding
entity.
Scheduling of Charging Events: In this phase, the EV generates a set
of pseudonyms for each of the selected CSs and the EUpr (or, the EUv)
blindly signs the pseudonyms. Next, the EV forwards the list of pseudonyms
associated with each CS to the EUsub.
From the scheduling requests of the EVs in an area (assumption 5), the
EUsub makes lists of CSs and the corresponding requesting pseudonyms




where, IDCS1, IDCS2, IDCS3 are the IDs of different CSs and Φ1, Φ2, Φ3
are the pseudonyms belonging to the same or different EVs, and the TW1,
TW2, TW3 are the corresponding charging time window of the requested
charging events. Next, the EUsub forwards the set of pseudonyms and TW
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Figure 5.4: Steps in the scheduling of charging events phase
to the corresponding CS.
After the communication with an EUsub, the EV generates, blinds and
sends a random token to the current EUsub. The EUsub forwards the blind
token to its supervising EUpr and receives the required credentials (e.g.,
signed token, validity time frame). Next, the credentials are forwarded to
the EV which uses them for scheduling the next charging event via next
EUsub.
Participation in Charging Events: For a moving EV, there can be mul-
tiple routes to a destination. After an EV schedules for charging event,
the available CSs distributed along its potential routes have the set of valid
pseudonyms. The maximum distance (dmax) a moving EV can travel can
be determined based on the current State-of-Charge (SoC), as dmax ∝ SoC.
Depending on the value of dmax, the EV selects a CS and calculates the ex-
pected arrival time, texp = dv , where, v is the speed of the EV and d ≤ dmax
is the distance from the CS. In current technology, smartphone navigation
applications are fairly accurate in predicting the time of arrivals considering
factors such as traffic conditions. The EV sends a request for participation
in a charging event. The request consists of a signed pseudonym, texp and
the required energy (ε).
EV → CS : Φi||σEUpr(Φi)||texp||ε
The CS checks the signature of EUpr on the pseudonym. The CS also has
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the TW associated with this pseudonym (received from the EUsub). If this
signature is valid and if texp is within the TW , this request is considered as
valid. After the EV arrives at the CS, it participates in the charging event.
Flexible Charging Operation: If an EV does not arrive at a pre-schedul-
ed event, it causes the CS some monetary loss because of the reserved time
and energy. In this paper, we assume that in case of failing to meet a sched-
ule, a penalty cost (CP ) is paid to the CS. The CP can be a fixed percentage
of the electricity price (real-time or scheduled). Suppose, an EV reserved a
charging event for U units of energy. The scheduled price (PSch) is referred
to as the price of electricity determined when the charging event was sched-
uled and real-time price (PRT ) is the electricity price when bought without
scheduling. If the EV pays a flat penalty cost for each of the missed CSs,
total penalty cost for missing m number of CSs is m ∗ CP . The EV can af-
ford to miss a scheduled charging event if the summation of total scheduled
energy cost and the total penalty cost is less than the total real-time energy
cost,
U ∗ PSch +
m∑
i=1
CP (i) ≤ U ∗ PRT (5.1)
where, CP (i) is the penalty cost for CSi. The maximum number of missed
CSs that can be afforded by the EV is the value of m for which the left side
of the equation is equal to the right side.
In this work, three stages for the arrival of an EV are considered, 1)
Timing Window (TW): the EV arrives at a CS within the designated TW, 2)
Pre-Arrival (PrA): the EV arrives at a CS before its TW, and 3) Post-Arrival
(PoA): The EV arrives at a CS after its TW is passed. There are two cases
of missing a scheduled charging event, 1) the EV misses the charging event
after communicating with the CS, and there are other CSs situated on the
routes which have its valid pseudonyms, 2) the EV has missed all the CSs in
the pre-planned route. In the former case, the EV reschedules for charging
event with another CS. In the latter case, the CSs in its actual route do not
have its pseudonyms and the EV schedules a charging event with its token




In this section, an analysis of the DoA achieved by the proposed method,
cost-efficient number of missed CSs and the regional sub-division, based
on MATLAB simulation, is presented. The arrival of EVs are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Poisson process, and the arrival rate (λ) is
varied from 0.1 to 0.9 at an interval of 0.2. In the plots against time slots,
the X-axis shows the cumulative time slots (not the local clock time, e.g.,
12AM). The DoA achieved by the system is determined by (3.5), and the
cumulative number of arrivals is considered as the anonymity set in each
time slot.
6.1 Variation of DoA in the Proposed Method
Fig. 6.1 demonstrates the variation of DoA with varying λ, in the Pre-
Arrival (PrA), Timing Window (TW) and Post-Arrival (PoA) stages of the
proposed method, from the perspective of a roaming EV. In other words,
this plot demonstrates the DoA achieved by an EV when it arrives at a CS
in the PrA, TW or PoA. Each curve in the figure corresponds to the DoA
achieved for a different λ. The value of λ corresponds to the number of
arrivals, which in turn determines the size of the anonymity set (i.e., DoA).
It can be assumed that the EVs are interested in participating in a charging
event within its TW to avoid the penalty cost. Moreover, each EV gener-
ates a single token to communicate with an EUsub or an EUpr, and mul-
tiple pseudonyms for a CS. As a result, the number of participations using
pseudonyms is larger than the number of participations using tokens. There-
fore, in Fig. 6.1, the λ shown in the legends are the arrival rates in the TW,
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Figure 6.1: Variation of DoA in pre-arrival, timing window and post-arrival time slots
and the arrival rates in the other two stages vary at a lower rate. It should
be noted that these different values of λs do not indicate that the arrival rate
in an area varies, rather, the number of transactions using token (in PrA
and PoA) or pseudonyms (in TW). The legends in the figure show the total
number of EVs that arrived in the three stages. The number of entities in an
anonymity set is represented by the number of possible customers partici-
pating in the transactions in a stage. Therefore, in Fig. 6.1, as more EVs
arrive in the cumulative time slots in each stage, the size of the anonymity
set increases, hence, the DoA increases. Similarly, a higher λ yields a higher
number of arrivals, thus, higher DoA. An EV achieves higher DoA if it ar-
rives within its own TW, and lower DoA if arrives earlier or later than the
TW.
6.2 Number of Missed CSs w.r.t. Electricity Price
Fig. 6.2 shows the variation of number of missed CSs allowed by the
proposed method w.r.t. the electricity price (real time and scheduled), and
the penalty cost. The allowed number of missed CSs means the maximum
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Figure 6.2: Number of missed CSs vs. scheduled and real time electricity price
number of CSs an EV can miss when the price is cost-effective, i.e., (total
PSch + total CP ) ≤ total PRT , which is derived from (5.1). The X-axis
shows the percentage of the PRT that equals the PSch, where price is the
total price and not the per unit price. In existing literature, it is assumed that
the information of PRT is frequently broadcast to an EV. Depending on this
price, an EV can decide on the number of CSs it can miss without spending
more than the electricity price.
6.3 Sub-division of a Regional Area
In this work, a network setup that sub-divides a region into smaller zones
(under the supervision of different EUsubs), is proposed. One of the motiva-
tions behind this network setup is to prevent a single entity (e.g.,EUpr) from
having enough information to correlate multiple transactions by an EV (us-
ing tokens or pseudonyms) to its owner’s original identity. Suppose, there
is no sub-division in an area. An EV collects blind tokens and schedules
a charging event via the EUpr. If the time interval between the collection
of token and scheduling is short, there might be cases when no other EV
has scheduled an appointment. As a result, it would be possible for the
41
(a) pdf of arrival of EVs for varying λ (b) cdf of arrival of EVs for varying λ
Figure 6.3: Determining the number of EVs in a sub-divided zone
EUpr to correlate this charging event with the identity of the owner of the
EV, although, s/he used a blind token. On the other hand, in the proposed
network setup, an EV collects a token from the EUpr for the first EUsub
on its route. Later, it collects tokens from one EUsub to communicate with
the next EUsub. As a result, if an EUpr needs to correlate all the charging
events of this EV, it needs to prevent all the EVs under the supervision of
these EUsubs from scheduling.
In this subsection, the proposed method to determine the size of the sub-
divided areas w.r.t. λ and DoA is studied based on the simulation results
shown in Fig. 6.3 and 6.4. The arrival of EVs in Fig. 6.3 is shown for one
of the three stages (e.g., PrA, TW or PoA).
Fig. 6.3a shows the probability density function (pdf) of the arrival of
EVs for varying λ, represented as normal distribution. Each of the curves
corresponds to an arrival rate and extends from its mean to (3× standard
deviation) on each side. Fig. 6.3b depicts the cumulative distribution func-
tion (cdf) of the same arrivals w.r.t. different λ. The cdf represents the
probability that the mean number of arrivals (Smean) in a time slot is less
than a certain value. For example, for an arrival rate of 0.1, the probability
that Smean is less than 10 is 1, i.e., Prob(Smean < 10) = 1. On the other
hand, for an arrival rate of 0.9, Prob(Smean < 40) = 1, Prob(Smean <
15) = 0.05, Prob(Smean < 10) = 0, and so on. Similarly, for an arrival rate
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(a) Probability of mean arrival of EVs vs. λ (b) DoA achieved for different λ
Figure 6.4: Determining the number of EVs in a sub-divided zone
of 0.7, Prob(Smean < 15) = 0.1 and Prob(Smean < 10) = 0.
The values from Fig. 6.3b are used to show the variation of probabilities
of different Smean w.r.t. λ in Fig. 6.4a. Fig. 6.4b, on the other hand,
shows the DoA achieved for different λ and the DoA achieved in an ideal
scenario considered in this work. A scenario is assumed as ideal when the
total number of arrivals in cumulative time slots is equal to the maximum
number of arrivals in an area, and the arrivals in each slot equals the mean
arrival. The optimal number of EVs in a sub-divided area is determined by
comparing the arrival rates in this particular area (Fig. 6.4a) to a desired
level of DoA (Fig. 6.4b), as described next.
Without loss of generality, suppose, based on statistical data, the maxi-
mum number of EVs (N ) scheduling charging events at the CSs in a region
is 350. For an ideal scenario, the number of arrivals of EVs in each time
slot equals to Smean. If dideal is the DoA achieved in the first time slot in the
ideal case, and the minimum desirable DoA in the system is 80% of dideal or
80% · log2(35012 ) = 3.893, then, desired Smean in each time slot is 2
3.893 ≈ 15.
From Fig. 6.4a, it can be seen that a λ ≤ 0.3 never achieves a mean ar-
rival of 15. On the other hand, a λ ≥ 0.7 has a higher probability (≥ 0.71)
of achieving the threshold Smean. Therefore, the desired arrival rate should
be ≥ 0.7, otherwise, the desired Smean (i.e., DoA) is not achieved. In Fig.
6.4b, the total number of arrived EVs for λ = 0.7 and λ = 0.9 are 198 and
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Figure 6.5: Steps of the method to sub-divide a regional area
273, respectively. As a result, the sub-division of a region into smaller zones
should be such that the number of EVs in a zone is on average 200 ∼ 300,
to achieve the desired DoA.
Another method of determining the number of EVs in a zone is to com-
pare the DoA in different cases. In Fig. 6.4b, the curves associated with
λ = 0.1 and λ = 0.3 achieves lower DoA than the desired 80% DoA, i.e.,
the cyan (curve with triangle marker) and orange curves (curve with rectan-
gle marker) are lower than the red curve (curve with asterisk marker). The
DoA achieved by λ = 0.5 is less than the desired DoA in 40% (approx.) of
the time. On the other hand, the DoA achieved by λ = 0.7 and λ = 0.9 are
more than the minimum desired DoA in approximately 88% and 90% of the
time. Hence, the desired arrival rate is 0.7 or 0.9. Consequently, we get the
same conclusion.
Fig. 6.5 summarizes the steps of the proposed method of sub-dividing a
regional area into smaller zones to achieve a desired level of DoA. In this





In this work, a privacy-preserving method to authenticate anonymous
EVs in the SG is proposed. The proposed method also provides flexibil-
ity in charging schedules to provide flexibility in charging by the EVs and
compensate monetary loss to the CSs for missed charging events by EVs.
However, in the MATLAB simulation in this work, the impact of factors
such as dynamic pricing, load-demand, etc. has not been considered. These
factors are likely to have an impact on the arrivals of EVs in charging events,
thus, in DoA. An investigation of the variation of anonymity w.r.t. grid con-
ditions is part of the future work.
In the proposed network setup in this work, a method to sub-divide large
regional area into smaller zones is proposed to achieve improved privacy.
In future work, a comparative analysis (theoretical, mathematical or exper-
imental) of the anonymity achieved in the sub-divided network setup and
a network setup without sub-division will be conducted. Additionally, an
analysis of the impact of dynamic pricing and load-demand on the cost-




The efficiency of the operations in the smart grid depends on the ancillary
services and information provided by the heterogeneous entities connected
to it. The threat to consumer privacy in the SG is likely to discourage con-
sumer participation in the grid operation. To maximize the facilities offered
by different SG features, privacy-preserving methods should be embedded
in the communication and information system in the grid. In this work, a
method is proposed to achieve privacy of the EVs participating in charg-
ing events. Additionally, the method addresses flexible charging schedules
for EVs. Simulation results are presented to show the variation of Degree
of Anonymity (DoA) at different stages of the proposed method, and cost-
effective number of missed CSs. Moreover, a network setup is proposed to
achieve better privacy by sub-dividing a regional area into smaller zones. A
method is demonstrated to determine the size of a sub-divided zone from the
simulation results depending on the desired DoA. Future works will focus
on analyzing the impact of factors such as electricity price, demand, etc.,
and the sub-division of an area on the achieved DoA.
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